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Distributed stochastic subgradient-free algorithm for
Nash equilibrium seeking in two-network zero-sum
games
Dandan Yue, Ziyang Meng
Abstract—This paper investigates the distributed Nash equilib-
rium seeking problem for two-network zero-sum games with set
constraints, where the two networks have the opposite nonsmooth
cost functions. The interaction of the agents in each network
is characterized by an unbalanced directed graph. We are
particularly interested in the case that the local cost function of
each agent in the two networks is unknown in this paper. We first
construct the stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles
based on the measurements of the local cost functions. Instead of
using subgradients of the local cost functions, the subgradient-
free two-variable oracles are employed to design the distributed
algorithm for the agents to search the Nash equilibrium. Under
the strong connectivity assumption, it is shown that the proposed
algorithm guarantees that the states of all the agents converge
almost surely to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium, where
the scale of the neighborhood can be arbitrarily small by selecting
suitable smooth parameter in the oracles. Numerical simulations
are finally given to validate the theoretical results.
Index Terms—Two-network zero-sum game, stochastic
subgradient-free two-variable oracle, Nash equilibrium,
distributed algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
Zero-sum game problem has arisen in engineering applica-
tion domains such as adversarial estimation of sensor networks
and power allocation of channels in presence of jammers [1],
[2]. Due to the theoretical significances and broad applications,
the study on how to search the Nash equilibrim has been
one of the main focuses of the works on zero-sum games
[3]. Various approaches have been developed to find the Nash
equilibrium in zero-sum games, including fictitious play [4],
best response approach [5], and subgradient-based approach
[6]. The above works [4]–[6] solve the problems in the
centralized settings and consider that all the strategic agents
are adversarial. Recently, the study on zero-sum games in the
networked settings has received much attention. In particular,
Gharesifard and Cortes [7] focused on the two-network zero-
sum games, where the two networks, viewed as two players,
were adversarial while the strategic agents in the same network
were collaborative. Based on the local information exchange,
a distributed method that synthesizes the consensus dynamics
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and the saddle point dynamics was designed to seek the Nash
equilibrium. Following the distributed framework proposed in
[7], many extended works have been presented to solve the
Nash equilibrium seeking problem in two-network zero-sum
games. In [8], the distributed projection gradient method was
proposed for the distributed constrained minimax problem,
which can be viewed as the constrained two-network zero-
sum game problem from the perspective of game theory.
Then, the authors of [9] focused on the case of the sequential
communication and an incremental algorithm was proposed
to enable the agents in different networks to update their
strategies asynchronously. Note that the graphs of the two
networks are fixed and undirected in [8] and [9], and the
authors of [10] developed a distributed subgradient algorithm
that works for the switching and unbalanced directed graphs.
The implementation of the aforementioned distributed algo-
rithms requires the gradient or subgradient information of the
agents’ cost functions. However, such information may be not
available when the objective/cost functions are unknown, or
it is costly to obtain in practical applications. In this paper,
we focus on the two-network zero-sum game problem where
the local cost function of each agent is unknown. In fact, the
gradient-free schemes have been used to solve the problems
of optimizations and games in presence of the unknown cost
functions. In particular, the authors of [11] and [12] introduced
the stochastic gradient-free methods to solve the optimization
problems. Ref. [11] focused on the centralized method and
ref. [12] extended it to a distributed method over a directed
graph. A stochastic gradient-free algorithm generated by the
stochastic differential inclusion was proposed for the noncoop-
erative games in [13]. In [14], the finite differences were used
to approximate the gradients. The evolution strategy, which is
developed based on the stochastic gradient approximator, was
used in [15] to solve the (centralized) minimax (or called two-
player zero-sum game) problem. Note that the cost functions
involve only one vector in [11] and [12] while each agent’s
local cost function depends on two vectors corresponding
to two networks in two-network zero-sum games. Therefore,
the stochastic gradient-free methods presented in [11] and
[12] can not be directly used for the two-network zero-sum
games. Although the methods developed in [13] and [14] solve
games (including zero-sum games), they require the objective
functions to be quadratic or smooth. The problem studied in
[15] is similar to that considered in this paper, however, it
is solved only in a centralized setting. Moreover, even in the
networked settings, the methods presented in [13]–[15] are
2not applicable to the two-network zero-sum games since the
agents (in the same network) can not reach agreement about
their estimations of the corresponding vector involved in the
network cost function. Motivated by the above discussions,
this paper aims at developing the distributed subgradient-free
algorithm for the two-network zero-sum games.
The main contributions of this paper are three-fold. First,
a distributed stochastic subgradient-free algorithm is proposed
to achieve the Nash equilibrium seeking of two-network zero-
sum games. Unlike existing works on the two-network zero-
sum games [7]–[10], no exact mathematical formulations but
only the measurements of the local cost functions are needed
herein. Second, different from the strategies adopted in [13]–
[15], the proposed algorithm solves the problem with the
general nonsmooth cost functions in a distributed manner.
Third, from a technical perspective, the two-variable oracles
are properly designed in this paper for the implementation of
the proposed algorithm. This can be viewed as an extension
of one-variable oracles given in refs. [11], [12].
The structure of this paper is as follows. The preliminaries
are provided and the problem is introduced in Section II. The
proposed algorithm is presented in Section III. The almost
sure convergence of the proposed algorithm is investigated in
Section IV. The numerical simulations are presented in Section
V and the conclusion is given in Section VI.
Notations: For a differentiable function f , let ∇xf(·, y) and
∇yf(x, ·) denote the gradients of f(·, y) at x and f(x, ·)
at y, respectively. For a locally Lipschitz and convex but
not necessarily differentiable function f , let ∂xf(·, y) and
∂yf(x, ·) denote the subgradients (or generalized gradients)
of f(·, y) at x and f(x, ·) at y, respectively. The following are
from refs. [16]–[18]. For the random variables a distributed
on the set U ⊆ Rn1 and b distributed on the set W ⊆ Rn2 ,
Ξ[a|b = b˜] = ∫U a˜ψ( a˜| b˜)da˜ denotes the conditional expecta-
tion of a given b = b˜ and Ξ[a]
∆
= Ξ
[
Ξ[a|b]] denotes the total
expectation of a, where ψ( a˜| b˜) is the conditional probability
density of a given b = b˜, and a˜ and b˜ are real vectors in U
andW , respectively. A random event happens “almost surely”
means that it happens “with probability one”. We will use these
two terminologies alternatively, and abbreviate “almost surely”
by a.s. in this paper. Ii is a vector where the i-th element is 1
and other elements are 0. 0n denotes an n-dimension vector
consisting of 0. |·| and ‖·‖ refer to the absolute value and the
Euclidean norm of a scalar and a vector, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Graph theory
Consider a directed graph G = (V , E), with a node set V
and an edge set E ⊆ V×V . For any s, i ∈ V , (s, i) ∈ E means
that node s sends its information to node i, and s is called the
neighbor (i.e., in-neighbor) of i. The adjacency matrix of G is
defined by A = [ais], where ais > 0 for s ∈ Ni and ais = 0
for s ∈ V/Ni, with Ni denoting the set of neighbors (i.e., in-
neighbors) of i in V (including itself). A is a row-stochastic
matrix if
∑
s∈V ais = 1 for any i ∈ V . A path from s to i
is a sequence of edges (s, s1), . . . , (sn, i). A directed graph is
strongly connected if there exists a path from any node s to
any node i for s 6= i.
B. Convex analysis
PX : R
n → X is the projection operator onto a closed
convex set X ⊆ Rn if for any vector x ∈ Rn, PX (x) satisfies
PX (x) ∈ X and ‖x − PX (x)‖ = infz∈X ‖x − z‖. A locally
Lipschitz function f(·) : Rn → R has the generalized gradient
∂xf . If f is convex, ∂xf coincides with the subdifferential of
f at x, where the subdifferential is the set of all subgradients,
i.e., ∂xf = {z ∈ Rn : f(y) − f(x) ≥ zT (y − x), ∀y ∈ Rn}.
A function f is concave if −f is convex. f(x, y) : Rn1 ×
R
n2 → R is (strictly) convex-concave if f(x, y) is (strictly)
convex with respect to x for any fixed y ∈ Rn2 and is (strictly)
concave with respect to y for any fixed x ∈ Rn1 .
C. Saddle point, zero-sum game, and Nash equilibrium
A pair (x∗, y∗) is a saddle point of F (x, y) on X × Y ⊆
R
n1 × Rn2 if F (x∗, y) ≤ F (x∗, y∗) ≤ F (x, y∗) for any
(x, y) ∈ X × Y . Suppose that X ⊆ Rn1 and Y ⊆ Rn2 are
two closed convex sets and F (x, y) is a strict convex-concave
function. Then, F has a unique saddle point [7], [10].
Suppose that the set of players in a game is denoted by
V = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and the cost function of player i ∈ V is
Fi
∆
= Fi(zi, z−i), where zi is the strategy of player i, z−i =
(z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1 . . . , zm), and m is the number of players.
The game is called a zero-sum game if
∑
i∈V Fi(zi, z−i) = 0.
Let Zi be the convex strategy set of player i. A profile z∗ =
(z∗i , z
∗
−i) is a Nash equilibrium if Fi(z
∗
i , z
∗
−i) ≤ Fi(zi, z∗−i)
holds for all zi ∈ Zi and i ∈ V . For a two-player zero-sum
game, a point pair (z∗1 , z
∗
2) is the Nash equilibrium if and only
if it is the saddle point of the cost function F1 [10].
D. Problem statement
Consider a network with m1 + m2 agents and consisting
of two subnetworks. The agents in the two subnetworks are
labeled as 1, 2, . . . ,m1 and 1, 2, . . . ,m2, respectively. Each
agent in the two subnetworks knows the numbers m1 and
m2, respectively. Denote V1 = {1, 2, . . . ,m1} and V2 =
{1, 2, . . . ,m2}. Let f1i(x, y) : Rn1 × Rn2 → R be the
(possibly nonsmooth) local cost function of each agent i ∈ V1.
The global cost function of the first subnetwork, i.e., F (x, y),
is the sum of all these local cost functions:
F (x, y) =
∑
i∈V1
f1i(x, y). (1)
Similarly, let f2j(x, y) : R
n1 × Rn2 → R be the (possibly
nonsmooth) local cost function of each agent j ∈ V2. The
global cost function of the second subnetwork, i.e., F˜ (x, y),
is the sum of all these local cost functions:
F˜ (x, y) = −
∑
j∈V2
f2j(x, y). (2)
We consider that the cost functions of these two subnetworks
satisfy
F (x, y) + F˜ (x, y) = 0 (3)
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Fig. 1: An illustrative example for the graph in the whole net-
work. The solid lines denote the communication links within
V1 and V2, and the dotted lines denote the communication
links between V1 and V2.
for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y . This implies that F (x, y) =∑
j∈V2
f2j(x, y). Note that the two subnetworks act as two
players and are engaged in a two-player zero-sum game. We
call such a game as a two-network zero-sum game [7], [10].
The strategy (constraint) set of this game is X × Y , where
X ⊆ Rn1 and Y ⊆ Rn2 are the closed and convex sets.
In this paper, the exact mathematical expressions of all the
local cost functions f1i and f2j are not available while each
agent i ∈ V1 and j ∈ V2 have access to the measurements of
f1i and f2j , respectively. To be more specific, given any pair
(x, y) ∈ Rn1 ×Rn2 , the value of f1i(x, y) can be obtained by
agent i ∈ V1 and the value of f2j(x, y) can be obtained by
agent j ∈ V2. Also, denote Z∗ = X ∗×Y∗ as the nonempty set
composed of the saddle point (x∗, y∗) of F (x, y) on X × Y .
For the setup of graphs, the agents share the information
with their neighbors in the same subnetwork, meanwhile, the
two subnetworks have access to the information about each
other. We describe the communications among the agents in
the whole network by a directed bipartite graph G consisting of
adjoint node sets V1 and V2, where each node has at least one
neighbor (not including itself). The communications within
each subnetwork are described by directed graphs G1 and G2,
respectively. Each node in V1 (or V2) has at least one neighbor
from V2 (or V1). An illustrative example for the graph of the
whole network is given in Fig. 1. In what follows, we let A1
and A2 be the adjacency matrices associated with G1 and G2,
which are row-stochastic.
The objective of this paper is to design a distributed stochas-
tic subgradient-free algorithm such that the Nash equilibrium
seeking is achieved for the considered two-network zero-sum
games.
III. DISTRIBUTED STOCHASTIC SUBGRADIENT-FREE
ALGORITHM
A. Two-variable Gaussian approximations of cost functions
Before presenting the proposed distributed stochastic
subgradient-free algorithm, we first define the smoothed ver-
sions of (1) and (2).
Fµ(x, y) =
∑
i∈V1
f1iµ(x, y), (4)
where f1iµ(x, y) =
1
κ1κ2
∫
U
∫
W f1i(x + µξ, y + µη)e
− 12‖ξ‖
2
·e− 12‖η‖2dηdξ is the two-variable Gaussian approximation
of f1i(x, y), µ ≥ 0 is the smooth parameters, κ1 =∫
U
e−
1
2‖ξ‖
2
dξ, κ2 =
∫
W
e−
1
2 ‖η‖
2
dη, and U ⊆ Rn1 and
W ⊆ Rn2 are two sets that are symmetric about 0n1 and
0n2 , respectively. In addition,
F˜µ(x, y) = −
∑
j∈V2
f2jµ(x, y),
where f2jµ(x, y) =
1
κ1κ2
∫
U
∫
W
f2j(x + µξ, y + µη)e
− 12‖ξ‖
2
·e− 12 ‖η‖2dηdξ is the two-variable Gaussian approximation of
f2j(x, y). It follows from (3) that
Fµ(x, y) =
∑
j∈V2
f2jµ(x, y). (5)
Denote Z∗µ = X ∗µ ×Y∗µ as the nonempty set composed of the
saddle point (x∗µ, y
∗
µ) of Fµ(x, y) on X × Y .
Note that in (4) and (5), the differentiability of fιsµ(x, y),
ι = 1, 2, s ∈ Vι, with respect to x and y depends on µ. For
µ > 0, it is not hard to see that fιsµ(x, y) is differentiable
with respect to both x and y, i.e., the gradients ∇xfιsµ(·, y)
and ∇yfιsµ(x, ·) exist, where ι = 1, 2, s ∈ Vι.
Assumption 3.1: fιs(x, y), ι = 1, 2, s ∈ Vι, is convex-
concave and locally Lipschitz on a set pair containing X ×Y .
The subgradients of fιs are bounded on the set pair containing
X ×Y , i.e., there exist positive constants D1 and D2 such that
‖∂xfιs(x, y)‖ ≤ D1 and ‖∂yfιs(x, y)‖ ≤ D2 for all ι ∈ {1, 2}
and s ∈ Vι. For each ι ∈ {1, 2}, at least one of fιs(x, y),
s ∈ Vι, is strictly convex-concave.
Assumption 3.2: The directed graphs G1 and G2 are strongly
connected and unbalanced.
B. The proposed algorithm
To achieve the Nash equilibrium seeking of the considered
two-network zero-sum games, we propose the distributed
stochastic subgradient-free algorithm. In the proposed algo-
rithm, each agent i ∈ V1 maintains two variables xki ∈ Rn1
and υki ∈ Rm1 , and each agent j ∈ V2 maintains two variables
ykj ∈ Rn2 and ωkj ∈ Rm2 . To be more specific, xki and ykj are
respectively the states of agents i and j, and υki and ω
k
j are
the auxiliary variables. At k-th step, where k = 0, 1, . . ., the
variables of agents i and j are updated according to
xk+1i = PX
(∑
s∈V1
a1isx
k
s −
αk
υkii
g1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i)
)
,
υk+1i =
∑
s∈V1
a1isυ
k
s ,
yk+1j = PY
(∑
s∈V2
a2jsy
k
s +
αk
ωkjj
g2jµ(Π
k
2j , y
k
j )
)
,
ωk+1j =
∑
s∈V2
a2jsω
k
s , (6)
where a1is and a2js are the entries of the adjacency matrices
A1 and A2. In addition, υ
k
i = (υ
k
i1, . . . , υ
k
im1
)T , i ∈ V1, ωkj =
(ωkj1, . . . , ω
k
jm2
)T , j ∈ V2. g1iµ(xki ,Πk1i) and g2jµ(Πk2j , ykj )
are the stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles which
are defined as:
g1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i)
=
f1i(x
k
i + µξ
k
1i,Π
k
1i + µη
k
1i)− f1i(xki ,Πk1i)
µ
ξk1i,
g2jµ(Π
k
2j , y
k
j )
=
f2j(Π
k
2j + µξ
k
2j , y
k
j + µη
k
2j)− f2j(Πk2j , ykj )
µ
ηk2j ,
4where µ > 0, ξk1i, ξ
k
2j ∈ Rn1 and ηk1i, ηk2j ∈ Rn2 are random
variables that are generated from the standard Gaussian dis-
tribution over U and W , respectively, Πk1i, i ∈ V1, and Πk2j ,
j ∈ V2, will be determined later. αk is a step size satisfying
αk > 0,
∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞ and
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k < ∞. The agents
i ∈ V1 and j ∈ V2 initialize the variables as x0i ∈ X , y0j ∈ Y ,
υ0i = Ii, and ω
0
j = Ij .
Each agent i ∈ V1 and j ∈ V2 perform the first and the third
equations of (6) to compute the two vectors involved in the
cost functions, i.e., x and y, respectively. Πk1i, i ∈ V1, is the
estimation of the vector y by agent i at step k and Πk2j , j ∈ V2,
is the estimation of the vector x by agent j at step k. According
to [8], [10], we can set Πk1i =
1∑
s∈V2
a1is
∑
s∈V2
a1isy
k
s and
Πk2j =
1∑
s∈V1
a2js
∑
s∈V1
a2jsx
k
s , where a1is > 0 if s ∈ V2
is a neighbor of i and a1is = 0 otherwise, in addition,
a2js is similarly defined for s ∈ V1. The second and the
fourth equations of (6) provide the estimations of the left
Perron eigenvectors of A1 and A2 by agents i ∈ V1 and
j ∈ V2, respectively. In addition, υkii and ωkjj are used to
scale the stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles such
that the imbalance issue is properly handled since A1 and
A2 are only row-stochastic. According to Perron-Frobenius
theorem [19], Aι, ι = 1, 2, has a positive left eigenvector
ρι = (ρι1, . . . , ριmι)
T corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 and
satisfying
∑
s∈Vι
ριs = 1.
Let x¯k and y¯k be defined as follows:
x¯k =
∑
i∈V1
ρ1ix
k
i , y¯
k =
∑
j∈V2
ρ2jy
k
j . (7)
Assumption 3.3: For any fixed ι ∈ {1, 2} and s ∈ Vι, both
the sequences {ξkιs} and {ηkιs} are independent and identically
distributed. For any i1, i2, i3, i4 ∈ V1, j1, j2, j3, j4 ∈ V2, i1 6=
i2, i3 6= i4, j1 6= j2 and j3 6= j4, the sequences {ξk1i1}, {ξk1i2},{ηk1i3}, {ηk1i4}, {ξk2j1}, {ξk2j2}, {ηk2j3} and {ηk2j4} are mutually
independent.
The following lemma presents the fundamental properties
of the two-variable Gaussian approximation functions and the
stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles. The proof
of this lemma is given in Appendix A. Let Fk be the σ-
field generated by the entire history of the random variables
in algorithm (6) from step 0 to k − 1. Specifically, F0 =
{x0i , y0j , i ∈ V1, j ∈ V2}, Fk = {x0i , y0j ; ξr1i, ηr1i, ξr2j , ηr2j ; i ∈
V1, j ∈ V2, 0 ≤ r ≤ k − 1} for k ≥ 1.
Lemma 3.1: Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 hold.
Let X˜ k = {x∗µ, xki , x¯k,Πk2j |i ∈ V1, j ∈ V2}, Y˜k = {y∗µ,
ykj , y¯
k,Πk1i|i ∈ V1, j ∈ V2}. Then,
(i) fιsµ(x, y) is convex-concave on X × Y for any ι ∈
{1, 2} and s ∈ Vι. In addition, for each ι ∈ {1, 2},
at least one of fιsµ(x, y) is strictly convex-concave on
X × Y , and fιs(x, y) − c ≤ fιsµ(x, y) ≤ fιs(x, y) + d
for any ι ∈ {1, 2} and s ∈ Vι, where c = µD2√n2,
d = µ(D1
√
n1 + D2
√
n2), D1 and D2 are given in
Assumption 3.1, and n1 and n2 are the dimensions of
the vectors x and y, respectively;
(ii) for any i ∈ V1, j ∈ V2 and k ≥ 0, it
holds that ∇xk
i
f1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i) = Ξ[g1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i)|Fk],
∇yk
j
f2jµ(Π
k
2j , y
k
j ) = Ξ[g2jµ(Π
k
2j , y
k
j )
∣∣Fk];
(iii) for any ι ∈ {1, 2}, s ∈ Vι, (x˜k, y˜k) ∈ X˜ k × Y˜k
and k ≥ 0, it holds that ∥∥∇x˜kfιsµ(x˜k, y˜k)
∥∥ ≤ M1,∥∥∇y˜kfιsµ(x˜k, y˜k)
∥∥ ≤M2, whereMι = [D2ι (4 + nι)2+
D23−ιn1n2 + 2D1D2(3 + nι)
3
2 (n3−ι)
1
2 ]
1
2 , ι = 1, 2;
(iv) for any i ∈ V1, j ∈ V2 and k ≥ 0, it holds that
Ξ[
∥∥g1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)
∥∥2|Fk] ≤ M21 , Ξ[
∥∥g1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)
∥∥2] ≤
M21 , Ξ[
∥∥g2jµ(Πk2j , ykj )
∥∥2|Fk] ≤ M22 , and Ξ[‖g2jµ(Πk2j ,
ykj )‖2] ≤M22 , where Mι, ι = 1, 2, is given in (iii).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we first show the almost sure consensus
of the agents’ states for each subnetworks, i.e., V1 and V2.
We then establish the almost sure convergence to the Nash
equilibrium of the agents’ states of the overall network.
To facilitate the subsequent analysis, we rewrite the first and
the third equations in (6) as
xk+1i =
∑
s∈V1
a1isx
k
s + ε
k
1i,
yk+1j =
∑
s∈V2
a2jsy
k
s + ε
k
2j , (8)
where εk1i = PX (
∑
s∈V1
a1isx
k
s − αkυkii g1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i)) −∑
s∈V1
a1isx
k
s , ε
k
2j = PY(
∑
s∈V2
a2jsy
k
s +
αk
ωk
jj
g2jµ(Π
k
2j , y
k
j ))
−∑s∈V2 a2jsyks .
A. Almost sure consensus
We first present a preliminary result and then establish
the almost sure consensus of the agents’ states for each
subnetworks. The proofs of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.1 are
given in Appendices B and C, respectively.
Lemma 4.1: For all i ∈ V1, j ∈ V2 and any k ≥ 0,
it holds that
∥∥εk1i
∥∥ ≤ αk
υk
ii
∥∥g1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)
∥∥, and ∥∥εk2j
∥∥ ≤
αk
ωk
jj
‖g2jµ(Πk2j , ykj )‖.
Theorem 4.1: Suppose that Assumptions 3.1-3.3 hold. Let
{xki }k≥0 and {ykj }k≥0 be generated by (6). Then, all agents
in V1 achieve consensus almost surely, while all agents in V2
achieve consensus almost surely. Specifically, for each i ∈ V1,
limk→∞ ‖xki − x¯k‖ = 0 with probability one, and for each
j ∈ V2, limk→∞ ‖ykj − y¯k‖ = 0 with probability one, where
x¯k and y¯k are given in (7).
B. Almost sure convergence to the Nash equilibrium
The following lemma presents the relation between Ξ[
(‖x¯k+1 − x∗µ‖2 + ‖y¯k+1 − y∗µ‖2)
∣∣Fk] and ‖x¯k − x∗µ‖2 + ‖y¯k
−y∗µ‖2, which will be used to show the almost sure conver-
gence. The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix D.
Lemma 4.2: Suppose that Assumptions 3.1-3.3 hold. Then,
for any (x∗µ, y
∗
µ) ∈ Z∗µ and k ≥ 0, it holds that
Ξ[(
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗µ
∥∥2 + ∥∥y¯k+1 − y∗µ
∥∥2)|Fk]
≤ (1 + α2k)(
∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2 + ∥∥y¯k − y∗µ
∥∥2) + pk − qk, (9)
where pk is a nonnegative random variable satisfying∑∞
k=0 Ξ[p
k] < ∞ and its expression is given in (17), qk =
2αk[−Fµ(x∗µ, y¯k) + Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ) + Fµ(x¯k, y∗µ)− Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ)].
5To this end, we have established the convergence result that
the agents’ states converge almost surely to the neighborhood
of the Nash equilibrium, and also specify the bounds of the
differences between the limits of the cost values of all the
agents and the cost value at the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2: Suppose that Assumptions 3.1-3.3 hold.
Let (x∗, y∗) be the Nash equilibrium, and {xki }k≥0 and
{ykj }k≥0 be generated by (6). Then, for each i ∈ V1,
limk→∞ F (x
k
i , y
∗) − F (x∗, y∗) ≤ ϑ with probability one,
and for each j ∈ V2, limk→∞ F (x∗, ykj ) − F (x∗, y∗) ≥ −ϑ
with probability one, where ϑ = µmin{m1,m2}(D1√n1 +
2D2
√
n2).
Proof: Consider the equation (9) given in Lemma 4.2.
Since pk ≥ 0 for all k ≥ 0, {∑ℓk=0 pk}ℓ≥0 is a non-
decreasing sequence. Then, it follows that Ξ[
∑∞
k=0 p
k] =
Ξ[ lim
ℓ→∞
∑ℓ
k=0 p
k] = lim
ℓ→∞
Ξ[
∑ℓ
k=0 p
k] = lim
ℓ→∞
∑ℓ
k=0 Ξ[p
k] =∑∞
k=0 Ξ[p
k], where the monotone convergence theorem has
been used in the second equality. Then, using the fact that∑∞
k=0 Ξ[p
k] < ∞, we know that Ξ[∑∞k=0 pk] < ∞. This
implies that
∑∞
k=0 p
k < ∞ a.s.. Moreover, we know that
qk ≥ 0 for any k ≥ 0 since Fµ(x∗µ, y¯k) ≤ Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ) and
Fµ(x¯
k, y∗µ) ≥ Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ) for any k ≥ 0, and
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k <
∞. Therefore, according to the supermartingale convergence
lemma due to Robbins-Siegmund (see Lemma 11 in [18]),
we can obtain that
∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2 + ∥∥y¯k − y∗µ
∥∥2 converges to
a certain nonnegative variable a.s. for any (x∗µ, y
∗
µ) ∈ Z∗µ,
and
∑∞
k=0 q
k < ∞ a.s.. The first result implies that both x¯k
and y¯k are bounded a.s., and hence the sequences {x¯k} and
{y¯k} have convergent subsequences a.s.. The second result
and the fact
∑∞
k=0 αk =∞ imply that lim inf
k→∞
[−Fµ(x∗µ, y¯k)+
Fµ(x
∗
µ, y
∗
µ) + Fµ(x¯
k, y∗µ) − Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ)] = 0 with probability
one. It then follows that lim infk→∞ Fµ(x
∗
µ, y¯
k) = Fµ(x
∗
µ, y
∗
µ)
and lim infk→∞ Fµ(x¯
k, y∗µ) = Fµ(x
∗
µ, y
∗
µ) with probability
one. Note that Fµ is continuous. Then, we know that there
exist convergent subsequences {x¯k1} and {y¯k1} such that
limk1→∞ Fµ(x
∗
µ, y¯
k1) = Fµ(x
∗
µ, limk1→∞y¯
k1) = Fµ(x
∗
µ, y
∗
µ)
and limk1→∞ Fµ(x¯
k1 , y∗µ) = Fµ(limk1→∞x¯
k1 , y∗µ) =
Fµ(x
∗
µ, y
∗
µ) with probability one. Furthermore, we know that
limk1→∞ x¯
k1 = x˜µ and limk1→∞ y¯
k1 = y˜µ for some pair
(x˜µ, y˜µ) ∈ Z∗µ with probability one. According to Lemma
3.1 (i), Fµ is strictly convex-concave, then it has a unique
saddle point on X × Y , i.e., Z∗µ = {(x∗µ, y∗µ)}. Therefore,
limk1→∞ x¯
k1 = x∗µ and limk1→∞ y¯
k1 = y∗µ with probability
one. This together with the fact that ‖x¯k − x∗µ‖2+‖y¯k − y∗µ‖2
is convergent a.s. implies that ‖x¯k − x∗µ‖2+ ‖y¯k − y∗µ‖2 con-
verges to zero a.s.. This further indicates that limk→∞‖x¯k −
x∗µ‖ = 0 (or limk→∞‖xki −x∗µ‖ = 0, i ∈ V1) with probability
one and limk→∞‖y¯k − y∗µ‖ = 0 (or limk→∞‖ykj − y∗µ‖ = 0,
j ∈ V2) with probability one.
Let (x∗, y∗) ∈ Z∗. Clearly, (x∗, y∗) is exactly
the Nash equilibrium of the two-network zero-
sum game. By virtue of the continuity of Fµ,
one has limk→∞ Fµ(x¯
k, y∗) = Fµ(x
∗
µ, y
∗) with
probability one. Denote ϑ1 = µmin{m1,m2}D2√n2,
ϑ2 = µmin{m1,m2}(D1√n1 +D2√n2). Based on Lemma
3.1 (i), we know that F (x¯k, y∗) ≤ Fµ(x¯k, y∗) + ϑ1
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Fig. 2: The graph of the subnetwork
for any k ≥ 0, and Fµ(x∗µ, y∗) ≤ Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ) ≤
Fµ(x
∗, y∗µ) ≤ F (x∗, y∗µ) + ϑ2 ≤ F (x∗, y∗) + ϑ2.
Therefore, limk→∞ F (x¯
k, y∗) ≤ F (x∗, y∗) + ϑ with
probability one, where ϑ = ϑ1 + ϑ2. Furthermore, for
each i ∈ V1, one has lim
k→∞
F (xki , y
∗) ≤ lim
k→∞
F (x¯k, y∗) +
| lim
k→∞
(F (xki , y
∗)− F (x¯k, y∗))| ≤ F (x∗, y∗) + ϑ with
probability one, where one has used Theorem 4.1 in the
second inequality. On the other hand, it follows from the
continuity of Fµ that limk→∞ Fµ(x
∗, y¯k) = Fµ(x
∗, y∗µ)
with probability one. Based on Lemma 3.1 (i), we know
that F (x∗, y¯k) ≥ Fµ(x∗, y¯k)− ϑ2 for any k ≥ 0, and
Fµ(x
∗, y∗µ) ≥ Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ) ≥ Fµ(x∗µ, y∗) ≥ F (x∗µ, y∗)− ϑ1 ≥
F (x∗, y∗) − ϑ1. Therefore, lim
k→∞
F (x∗, y¯k) ≥ F (x∗, y∗) − ϑ
with probability one. Furthermore, for each j ∈ V2,
lim
k→∞
F (x∗, ykj ) ≥ lim
k→∞
F (x∗, y¯k) − | lim
k→∞
(F (x∗, ykj )
−F (x∗, y¯k))| ≥ F (x∗, y∗) − ϑ with probability one, where
one has used Theorem 4.1 in the second inequality.
Remark 4.1: The bound provided in Theorem 4.1 is gener-
ated due to the use of the subgradient-free two-variable oracles
instead of the true subgradients, and it can be sufficiently close
to 0 by choosing the smooth parameter µ > 0 to be sufficiently
small.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Consider a zero-sum game engaged by two (sub)networks.
Each subnetwork has 10 agents. The sets of the agents
are V1 = {1, . . . , 10} and V2 = {1, . . . , 10}, respectively.
The cost function of the first subnetwork is F (x, y) =∑
i∈V1
f1i(x, y), where f11(x, y) =
1
10 (|x| − |y|) + cos y2
and f1i(x, y) =
i
10x
2 − i5y2 − 110 cos x2 for i ∈ V1/{1}.
The cost function of the second subnetwork is F˜ (x, y) =
−∑j∈V2 f2j(x, y), where f21(x, y) = 110 |x| − 110 |y| −
9
10 cos
x
2 − 9y2 and f2j(x, y) = j10x2 − 15y2 + 19 cos y2 for
j ∈ V2/{1}. Set X = Y = U =W = [−1, 1]. The two subnet-
works are equipped with the same strongly connected and un-
balanced directed graph shown in Fig. 2, where each node has
a self-loop which is not drawn in Fig. 2. There is an undirected
communication link between any i ∈ V1 and j ∈ V2, where
j = i. It can be shown that F (x, y)+ F˜ (x, y) = 0 and F (x, y)
has a unique saddle point (i.e., the unique Nash equilibrium
of the game) (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0). We also set αk =
0.1
k+1 ,
µ = 0.001. Fig. 3 illustrates the total errors between the
agents’ states in the two subnetworks (or V1 and V2) and
the Nash equilibrium (x∗, y∗), i.e.,
√∑
i∈V1
(xki − x∗)2 and√∑
j∈V2
(ykj − y∗)2. It can be seen from Fig. 3 that the total
errors approach to 10−4 (i.e., the size of the Nash equilibrium’s
neighborhood to which all the agents converge) as the iteration
steps increase. This is consistent with our theoretical results.
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Fig. 3: The total errors between the agents’ states and the Nash
equilibrium
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a distributed stochastic
subgradient-free algorithm for achieving the Nash equilibrium
in two-network zero-sum games, where the local cost
functions are unknown. The proposed algorithm introduces
the subgradient-free two-variable oracles and is applicable
to the unbalanced directed graphs. It is shown that by using
the proposed algorithm, the agents’ states converge almost
surely to a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium and the
neighborhood can be arbitrary small by taking suitable
smooth parameter.
APPENDIX A
For simplicity, we only prove the results for i ∈ V1 and
those for j ∈ V2 can be similarly obtained.
(i) Based on the definition of f1iµ and the fact that f1i
is (strictly) convex-concave on the set containing X × Y ,
it is not hard to show that f1iµ is (strictly) convex-concave
on X × Y . For any (x, y) ∈ X × Y , we denote f˜i(x, y) =
1
κ1κ2
∫
U
∫
W
(f1i(x+ µξ, y + µη)− f1i(x, y + µη))e− 12‖ξ‖2 ·
e−
1
2‖η‖
2
dηdξ, ˜˜fi(x, y) =
1
κ1κ2
∫
U
∫
W
(f1i(x, y + µη)− f1i(x,
y))e−
1
2‖ξ‖
2
e−
1
2‖η‖
2
dηdξ. It is clear that f1iµ(x, y)− f1i(x, y)
= f˜i(x, y)+
˜˜
f i(x, y). Let c and d be two constants which are
given in Lemma 3.1 (i). Using the convexity of f1i(·, y+µη)
at x, one has f˜i(x, y) ≥ 1κ1κ2
∫
W
(
∫
U
µξT e−
1
2‖ξ‖
2
dξ)∂xf1i(·,
y + µη)e−
1
2‖η‖
2
dη = 0. Using the concavity of f1i(x, ·)
at y + µη and the fact that ‖∂y+µηf1i(x, ·)‖ ≤ D2 given
in Assumption 3.1, one has
˜˜
fi(x, y) ≥ − 1κ1κ2
∫
U
∫
W µ ‖η‖
‖∂y+µηf1i(x, ·)‖ e− 12 ‖ξ‖2e− 12‖η‖2dηdξ ≥ −c. Therefore,
f1iµ(x, y) ≥ f1i(x, y) − c. By using a symmetric analysis,
we can obtain f1iµ(x, y) ≤ f1i(x, y) + d.
(ii) This part of proof is similar to that of (21) in [11],
which however, concerns the one-variable cost function, i.e.,
fµ(x). Suppose that the variables x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , ξ ∈ U
and η ∈ W are independent with respect to each other. Then,
all the mathematical manipulations performed for fµ(x) in the
proof of (21) in [11] can be similarly performed for f1iµ(x, y).
By performing such manipulations and using the facts that
f1i(x, y) is independent on (ξ, η) and
∫
U
e−
1
2‖ξ‖
2
ξdξ = 0,
it is not hard to show that ∇xf1iµ(x, y) = 1κ1κ2
∫
U
∫
W
f1i(x+µξ,y+µη)−f1i(x,y)
µ
e−
1
2 ‖ξ‖
2
e−
1
2‖η‖
2
ξdηdξ, where the de-
tailed calculations are omitted due to space limitations. Note
that for any fixed k ≥ 0, the variables xki , Πk1i, ξk1i and
ηk1i are independent with respect to each other. Moreover,
we know that given i ∈ V1, there exists s ∈ V2 such that
a1is > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume a1is > 0
for each s ∈ V2. Then, based on the facts that yks ∈ Y for
all s ∈ V2, Y is a convex set, 0 < a1is∑
s∈V2
a1is
< 1 and
1∑
s∈V2
a1is
∑
s∈V2
a1is = 1, we know that Π
k
1i ∈ Y . Thus,
it follows that the above obtained expression of ∇xf1iµ(x, y)
holds for x = xki , y = Π
k
1i, ξ = ξ
k
1i and η = η
k
1i. According
to the definition of the conditional expectation Ξ[·|·] given in
Section I and Assumption 3.3, it is not hard to show that
∇xk
i
f1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i) = Ξ[g1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i)|Fk].
(iii) It is not hard to show that Πk2j ∈ X , x¯k ∈ X and y¯k ∈
Y . Under Assumption 3.3, it can be shown that the expression
of ∇xf1iµ(x, y) obtained in the proof of (ii) holds for x = x˜k,
y = y˜k, ξ = ξk1i and η = η
k
1i, where x˜
k ∈ X˜ k and y˜k ∈ Y˜k. It
then follows that for any fixed k ≥ 0, ∥∥∇x˜kf1iµ(x˜k, y˜k)
∥∥ ≤
1
κ1κ2
∫
U
∫
W
√
g˜ki e
− 12‖ξk1i‖2e− 12‖ηk1i‖2dηk1idξk1i = Ξ[
√
g˜ki ],
where g˜ki = (D1
∥∥ξk1i
∥∥+D2
∥∥ηk1i
∥∥)2∥∥ξk1i
∥∥2. Let Mι, ι = 1, 2,
be a constant which is given in Lemma 3.1 (iii). It is shown
by the definition of the total expectation Ξ[·] and Assumption
3.3 that Ξ[g˜ki ] ≤M21 , where Lemma 1 in [11] has been used.
Then, it follows from the relation Ξ[
√
g˜ki ] ≤
√
Ξ[g˜ki ] that∥∥∇x˜kf1iµ(x˜k, y˜k)
∥∥ ≤ √Ξ[g˜ki ] ≤ M1. Moreover, using the
similar arguments to those employed to obtain ∇xf1iµ(x, y)
in the proof of (ii), we can derive ∇yf1iµ(x, y) = 1κ1κ2
∫
U
∫
W
f1i(x+µξ,y+µη)−f1i(x,y)
µ
e−
1
2‖ξ‖
2
e−
1
2‖η‖
2
ηdηdξ. It then follows
that for any fixed k ≥ 0, ∥∥∇y˜kf1iµ(x˜k, y˜k)
∥∥ ≤ Ξ[√g¯ki ],
where g¯ki = (D1
∥∥ξk1i
∥∥ + D2
∥∥ηk1i
∥∥)2∥∥ηk1i
∥∥2. It follows from
the similar analysis by which we obtain
∥∥∇x˜kf1iµ(x˜k, y˜k)
∥∥ ≤
M1 that
∥∥∇y˜kf1iµ(x˜k, y˜k)
∥∥ ≤M2.
(iv) Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3, it is not hard to
show that
∥∥g1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)
∥∥2 ≤ g˜ki and Ξ[g˜ki |Fk] = Ξ[g˜ki ],
where g˜ki is given in the proof of (iii). Therefore, one has
Ξ[
∥∥g1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)
∥∥2|Fk] ≤M21 , Ξ[
∥∥g1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)
∥∥2] ≤M21 .
APPENDIX B
It is not hard to show that
∑
s∈V1
a1isx
k
s ∈ X , ∀k ≥ 0.
From the proof of Proposition 1 in [20], we know that υkii
is positive for any k ≥ 0. Then, following Lemma 1 (b) in
[21], one has
∥∥εk1i
∥∥ ≤ αk
υk
ii
∥∥g1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)
∥∥ for any k ≥ 0.
Similarly, we can obtain that
∥∥εk2j
∥∥ ≤ αk
ωk
jj
∥∥g2jµ(Πk2j , ykj )
∥∥
for any k ≥ 0.
APPENDIX C
We first focus on the analysis for any i ∈ V1 and
k ≥ 2. Denote [Ak1 ]is as the entry of the matrix Ak1 . By
using (8) recursively, we obtain xki =
∑
s∈V1
[Ak1 ]isx
0
s +∑k−1
r=1
∑
s∈V1
[Ak−r1 ]isε
r−1
1s + ε
k−1
1s . Moreover, from (7) and
(8), one has x¯k =
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i(
∑
s∈V1
a1isx
k−1
s + ε
k−1
1i ) =
x¯k−1 +
∑
i∈V1
ρ1iε
k−1
1i for all k ≥ 1. By using this fact
recursively, one obtains x¯k =
∑
s∈V1
ρ1sx
0
s +
∑k−1
r=1
∑
s∈V1
ρ1sε
r−1
1s +
∑
s∈V1
ρ1sε
k−1
1s for all k ≥ 2. It then follows
that ‖xki − x¯k‖ ≤
∑
s∈V1
|[Ak1 ]is − ρ1s|‖x0s‖ +
∑k−1
r=1
∑
s∈V1
7|[Ak−r1 ]is − ρ1s|‖εr−11s ‖ + (1 − ρ1i)‖εk−11i ‖ +
∑
s∈V1,s6=i
ρ1s‖εk−11s ‖, ∀k ≥ 2. According to Proposition 1 in [20], we
know that there exist β > 0 and 0 < γ < 1 such that for
any i, s ∈ V1 and k ≥ 0,
∣∣[Ak1 ]is − ρ1s
∣∣ ≤ βγk. Using this
fact for the first two terms on the right-hand side of the above
inequality and the fact 0 < ρ1s < 1, ∀s ∈ V1, for the last two
terms, one has that for any k ≥ 2,
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥ ≤ λ¯k1 + λ¯k2 + λ¯k3 , (10)
where λ¯k1 = βγ
k
∑
s∈V1
∥∥x0s
∥∥, λ¯k2 = β
∑k−1
r=1 γ
k−r
∑
s∈V1∥∥εr−11s
∥∥, λ¯k3 =
∑
s∈V1
∥∥εk−11s
∥∥. By taking the square and
the total expectation on both sides of (10), one obtains
Ξ[
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥2] ≤ 3(λ¯k1)2 + Ξ[3(λ¯k2)2] + Ξ[3(λ¯k3)2], ∀k ≥ 2,
where the fact (λ¯k1 + λ¯
k
2 + λ¯
k
3)
2 ≤ 3[(λ¯k1)2 + (λ¯k2)2 + (λ¯k3)2]
has been used. We next show that
∑∞
k=2 Ξ[
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥2] <∞,
∀i ∈ V1.
Given an arbitrary ℓ ≥ 2. It is not hard to show that∑ℓ
k=2 3(λ¯
k
1)
2 = 3β2(
∑
s∈V1
∥∥x0s
∥∥)2 γ4(1−γ2(ℓ−1))1−γ2 . Note that
3(λ¯k2)
2 = 3β2
∑k−1
r=1
∑k−1
r′=1 γ
2k−r−r′
∑
s∈V1
∑
s′∈V1
‖εr−11s ‖
·‖εr′−11s′ ‖. It follows from the relation ‖εr−11s ‖
∥∥εr′−11s′
∥∥ ≤
1
2 (‖εr−11s ‖2 +
∥∥εr′−11s′
∥∥2) that 3(λ¯k2)2 ≤ 3m1β2
∑k−1
r=1
∑k−1
r′=1
γ2k−r−r
′∑
s∈V1
‖εr−11s ‖
2
. By virtue of Lemma 4.1 and
Lemma 3.1 (iv), one has Ξ[
∥∥εr−11s
∥∥2] ≤ α
2
r−1
(υr−1ss )
2M21 , ∀r ≥ 1.
It follows from both Lemma 1 and the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 in [20] that 1
υrss
> 0 is bounded for all s ∈ V1
and r ≥ 0. In other words, there exists a finite positive
constant υ˜ such that 1
υ
r−1
ss
≤ υ˜, ∀r ≥ 1. Thus, we have
Ξ[
∥∥εr−11s
∥∥2] ≤ α2r−1υ˜2M21 , r ≥ 1. It then follows that
the total expectation of 3(λ¯k2)
2 satisfies that Ξ[3(λ¯k2)
2] ≤
~
∑k−1
r=1 α
2
r−1
∑k−1
r′=1 γ
2k−r−r′ = ~1−γ
∑k−1
r=1 α
2
r−1(γ
k−r+1 −
γ2k−r), where ~ = 3m21β
2υ˜2M21 . We thus know that∑ℓ
k=2 Ξ[3(λ
k
2)
2
] ≤ ~1−γ
∑ℓ
k=2
∑k−1
r=1 α
2
r−1(γ
k−r+1−γ2k−r).
Note that
∑ℓ
k=2
∑k−1
r=1 α
2
r−1(γ
k−r+1− γ2k−r) =∑ℓ−1r=1 α2r−1∑ℓ
k=r+1(γ
k−r+1 − γ2k−r) =∑ℓ−1r=1 α
2
r−1
1−γ2 (γ
2ℓ−r+2 − γℓ−r+3
−γℓ−r+2 − γr+2 + γ2 + γ3) ≤ 1+γ2+γ31−γ2
∑ℓ−1
r=1 α
2
r−1, where
the inequality follows from the facts 0 < γ < 1 and
2ℓ − r + 2 > 0. Therefore, we have ∑ℓk=2 Ξ[3(λk2)
2
] ≤
~(1+γ2+γ3)
(1−γ)(1−γ2)
∑ℓ−1
r=1 α
2
r−1. Moreover, by noting that 3(λ¯
k
3)
2 ≤
3m1
∑
s∈V1
‖εk−11s ‖
2
, it can be shown that
∑ℓ
k=2 Ξ[3(λ¯
k
3)
2
] ≤
3m21υ˜
2M21
∑ℓ
k=2 α
2
k−1. Based on the above analysis, we ob-
tain
∑∞
k=2{3(λ¯k1)2+Ξ[3(λ¯k2)2]+Ξ[3(λ¯k3)2]} <∞ as ℓ→∞,
where we have used the facts 0 < γ < 1 and
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k <∞.
Therefore, we have
∑∞
k=2 Ξ[
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥2] <∞, ∀i ∈ V1.
Following the similar analysis to obtain (10), we can derive
that for any i ∈ V1,
∥∥x1i − x¯1
∥∥ ≤ λ¯11 + λ¯13, where λ¯11 =
βγ
∑
s∈V1
∥∥x0s
∥∥, λ¯13 =
∑
s∈V1
∥∥ε01s
∥∥. Based on this fact, it can
be shown that Ξ[
∥∥x1i − x¯1
∥∥2] < ∞, ∀i ∈ V1. Summarizing
all the above analysis, we have
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥2] < ∞,
∀i ∈ V1. This also implies that given any i ∈ V1, one
has Ξ[
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥2] < ∞ for all k ≥ 0. Based on these
two facts and Theorem 4.2.1 in [16], we know that for each
i ∈ V1, the sequence {
∑ℓ
k=0
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥2}ℓ≥0 is almost surely
convergent. This implies that for each i ∈ V1, the limit of
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥2 exists with probability one as k → ∞, and
limk→∞
∥∥xki − x¯k
∥∥ = 0 with probability one, i.e., all the
agents in V1 achieve consensus almost surely.
Applying the similar analysis above for i ∈ V1 to j ∈ V2,
one can obtain
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[
∥∥ykj − y¯k
∥∥2] <∞, ∀j ∈ V2. Further-
more, we can derive that for each j ∈ V2, limk→∞ ‖ykj−y¯k‖ =
0 with probability one, i.e., all the agents in V2 achieve
consensus almost surely.
APPENDIX D
For the simplicity of the notation, we will use g1iµ,k
to represent g1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i) for the remaining proofs. In the
proof of Theorem 4.1, one obtained that for any k ≥ 0,
x¯k+1 = x¯k +
∑
i∈V1
ρ1iε
k
1i. Then, it follows that for any
(x∗µ, y
∗
µ) ∈ Z∗µ and k ≥ 0,
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗µ
∥∥2 = ∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2 +
‖∑i∈V1 ρ1iεk1i‖2 + 2(x¯k − x∗µ)T (
∑
i∈V1
ρ1iε
k
1i). Taking the
conditional expectation for both sides of this equality on Fk
yields
Ξ[
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗µ
∥∥2∣∣Fk]
=
∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2 + Ξ[∥∥
∑
i∈V1
ρ1iε
k
1i
∥∥2∣∣Fk]
+Ξ[2(x¯k − x∗µ)T (
∑
i∈V1
ρ1iε
k
1i)
∣∣Fk]. (11)
Let φk1 =
∑
i∈V1
2ρ1i(x¯
k − x∗µ)T (εk1i + αkυk
ii
g1iµ,k), φ
k
2 =∑
i∈V1
2αk(x¯
k − x∗µ)T 1υk
ii
(υkii−ρ1i)g1iµ,k, φk3 = −
∑
i∈V1
2αk(x¯
k − x∗µ)T g1iµ,k. It is clear that 2(x¯k − x∗µ)T (
∑
i∈V1
ρ1iε
k
1i) = φ
k
1 + φ
k
2 + φ
k
3 .
For φk1 , we have φ
k
1 = 2
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i(x¯
k − x¯k+1 +
x¯k+1 −xk+1i + xk+1i − x∗µ)T (εk1i + αkυk
ii
g1iµ,k) ≤ 2
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i
·(∥∥x¯k − x¯k+1∥∥+ ∥∥x¯k+1 − xk+1i
∥∥)∥∥εk1i + αkυkii g1iµ,k
∥∥, where
the fact that (xk+1i − x∗µ)T (εk1i + αkυk
ii
g1iµ,k) ≤ 0 based on
Lemma 1 (a) in [21] has been used in the inequality. Then,
Ξ[φk1
∣∣Fk] ≤ ζk1 + ζk2 , (12)
where ζk1 = Ξ[4
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i‖x¯k − x¯k+1‖ αkυk
ii
‖g1iµ,k‖ |Fk],
ζk2 = Ξ[4
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i
∥∥x¯k+1 − xk+1i
∥∥αk
υk
ii
∥∥g1iµ,k
∥∥|Fk], with
Lemma 4.1 being used.
For φk2 , it follows that φ
k
2 ≤
∑
i∈V1
[
α2k
m1
∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2+m1υ˜2
·|υkii−ρ1i|2‖g1iµ,k‖2] ≤ α2k
∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2+m1υ˜2 β2γ2k∑i∈V1
‖g1iµ,k‖2, where the relation |υkii − ρ1i| ≤ βγk (see Proposi-
tion 1 in [20]) has been used in the second inequality, and β
and γ have been given in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Taking
the conditional expectation for both sides of this equation on
Fk and using Lemma 3.1 (iv) yield
Ξ[φk2
∣∣Fk] ≤ α2k
∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2 +m21υ˜2β2M21 γ2k. (13)
For φk3 , it follows that φ
k
3 = −
∑
i∈V1
2αk(x¯
k − xki + xki−
x∗µ)
T g1iµ,k. Let ζ
k
3 = M1
∑
i∈V1
2αk
∥∥x¯k − xki
∥∥. By tak-
ing the conditional expectation for φk3 on Fk, one obtains
Ξ[φk3 |Fk] = −
∑
i∈V1
2αk(x¯
k − xki )TΞ[g1iµ,k|Fk] −
∑
i∈V1
2αk(x
k
i − x∗µ)TΞ[g1iµ,k|Fk] ≤ ζk3 +2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
∗
µ,Π
k
1i)
−f1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)], where the relations Ξ[g1iµ,k
∣∣Fk] =
∇xk
i
f1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i) and ‖∇xki f1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)‖ ≤ M1 and the
8convexity of f1iµ(·,Πk1i) at xki , which are based on Lemma
3.1 (i)-(iii), have been used in the inequality.
To present the upper bound of 2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
∗
µ,Π
k
1i)−
f1iµ(x
k
i ,Π
k
1i)], we introduce ζ˜
k
4 = 2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
∗
µ,Π
k
1i)−
f1iµ(x
∗
µ, y¯
k)], ζ˜k5 = 2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x¯
k, y¯k) − f1iµ(xki , y¯k)],
and ζ˜k6 = 2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
k
i , y¯
k) − f1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)]. It
is clear that 2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
∗
µ,Π
k
1i) − f1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)] =
ζ˜k4+2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
∗
µ, y¯
k)−f1iµ(x¯k, y¯k)]+ ζ˜k5+ ζ˜k6 . For ζ˜k4 ,
it follows that ζ˜k4 ≤ 2αk
∑
i∈V1
∇y¯kf1iµ(x∗µ, y¯k)(Πk1i− y¯k) ≤
2αk
∑
i∈V1
∥∥∇y¯kf1iµ(x∗µ, y¯k)
∥∥ ∥∥ 1∑
s∈V2
a1is
∑
s∈V2
a1isy
k
s −
y¯k
∥∥ = 2αk
∑
i∈V1
∥∥∇y¯kf1iµ(x∗µ, y¯k)
∥∥ ∥∥∑
s∈V2
a1is∑
s∈V2
a1is
(yks − y¯k)
∥∥ ≤ ζk4 , where we have used the concavity of
f1iµ(x
∗
µ, ·) at y¯k in the first inequality, the definition of Πk1i
in the second inequality, and Lemma 3.1 (iii) in the last
inequality, with ζk4 = 2αkm1M2
∑
s∈V2
∥∥yks − y¯k
∥∥. Similarly,
it can be shown that ζ˜k5 ≤ 2αk
∑
i∈V1
∇x¯kf1iµ(x¯k, y¯k)(x¯k−
xki ) ≤ ζk5 and ζ˜k6 ≤ 2αk
∑
i∈V1
∇Πk1if1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)(y¯k −Πk1i)≤ ζk4 , where ζk5 = 2αkM1
∑
i∈V1
‖x¯k − xki ‖. It then follows
that 2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
∗
µ,Π
k
1i) − f1iµ(xki ,Πk1i)] ≤ 2ζk4 + ζk5+
2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
∗
µ, y¯
k)− f1iµ(x¯k, y¯k)]. Therefore,
Ξ[φk3
∣∣Fk] ≤ ζk3 + 2ζk4 + ζk5
+ 2αk
∑
i∈V1
[f1iµ(x
∗
µ, y¯
k)− f1iµ(x¯k, y¯k)]. (14)
Note that Ξ[
∥∥∑
i∈V1
ρ1iε
k
1i
∥∥2∣∣Fk] ≤ Ξ[∑i∈V1 ρ1i‖εk1i‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ Ξ[
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i
α2k
(υk
ii
)2
‖g1iµ,k‖2|Fk] ≤ α2kυ˜2M21 , where
we have used the fact that ‖·‖2 is a convex function in the first
inequality, Lemma 4.1 in the second inequality, and Lemma
3.1 (iv) and
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i = 1 in the third inequality. Substituting
the above inequality and the equations (12)-(14) into the right-
hand side of (11) yields that for any k ≥ 0,
Ξ[
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗µ
∥∥2∣∣Fk] ≤ (1 + α2k)
∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2 + pk1
+ 2αk[Fµ(x
∗
µ, y¯
k)− Fµ(x¯k, y¯k)], (15)
where pk1 = 2
∑5
ι=1 ς
k
ι + υ˜
2M21α
2
k + m
2
1υ˜
2β2M21 γ
2k.
Next, we show that
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[p
k
1 ] < ∞. We first con-
sider
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[2ς
k
2 ]. For any k ≥ 0, one has ζk2 ≤
Ξ[2
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i(
∥∥x¯k+1 − xk+1i
∥∥2 + α2k
(υk
ii
)2
‖g1iµ,k‖2)|Fk] ≤
2
∑
i∈V1
ρ1iΞ[
∥∥x¯k+1 − xk+1i
∥∥2|Fk] + 2α2kυ˜2M21 . Then, we
know that
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[2ζ
k
2 ] ≤ 4
∑
i∈V1
ρ1i
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[‖x¯k+1−
xk+1i ‖2]+4υ˜2M21
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k. It has been shown in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 that
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[
∥∥x¯k − xki
∥∥2] <∞ for each i ∈ V1.
Thus, we know that
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[2ζ
k
2 ] < ∞. For ι = 1, 3, 4, 5,
we can similarly derive
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[2ς
k
ι ] ≤ ςˆkι + ~ˆι
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k,
where ςˆkι satisfies ςˆ
k
ι < ∞, ~ˆι is a finite positive constant.
This implies that
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[2ς
k
ι ] < ∞, where ι = 1, 3, 4, 5.
Moreover, we know that
∑∞
k=0 γ
2k ≤ 11−γ2 < ∞, and
therefore
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[p
k
1 ] <∞.
On the other hand, we know that y¯k+1 = y¯k +∑
j∈V2
ρ2jε
k
2j , ∀k ≥ 0. It follows from the similar analysis
to obtain (15) and
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[p
k
1 ] <∞ that for any k ≥ 0,
Ξ[
∥∥y¯k+1 − y∗µ
∥∥2∣∣Fk] ≤ (1 + α2k)
∥∥y¯k − y∗µ
∥∥2 + pk2
− 2αk[Fµ(x¯k, y∗µ)− Fµ(x¯k, y¯k)], (16)
where pk2 is nonnegative and satisfying
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[p
k
2 ] <∞.
Summing up (15) and (16) yields that for any k ≥ 0,
Ξ[(
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗µ
∥∥2 + ∥∥y¯k+1 − y∗µ
∥∥2)∣∣Fk]
≤ (1 + α2k)(
∥∥x¯k − x∗µ
∥∥2 + ∥∥y¯k − y∗µ
∥∥2) + pk − qk, (17)
where pk = pk1 + p
k
2 , q
k = 2αk[−Fµ(x∗µ, y¯k) + Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ) +
Fµ(x¯
k, y∗µ)−Fµ(x∗µ, y∗µ)]. It is obvious that
∑∞
k=0 Ξ[p
k] <∞.
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